The Looming Shadows of the Walls. Is a Cosmopolitan Europe still Possible? by Cicchelli, Vincenzo & Pendenza, Massimo
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PACO, ISSN: 2035-6609 - Copyright © 2015 - University of Salento, SIBA: http://siba-ese.unisalento.it 
 
 
 
PArtecipazione e COnflitto 
* The Open Journal of Sociopolitical Studies 
http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco 
ISSN: 1972-7623 (print version) 
ISSN: 2035-6609 (electronic version) 
PACO, Issue 8(3) 2015: 625-642 
DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v8i3p625 
 
Published in November 15, 2015 
Work licensed under a Creative Commons At-
tribution-Non commercial-Share alike 3.0 
Italian License  
EDITORIAL 
 
THE LOOMING SHADOW OF THE WALLS 
Is a Cosmopolitan Europe still Possible? 
 
 
Vincenzo Cicchelli  
University of Paris Descartes, Gemass (Paris Sorbonne/CNRS) 
 
Massimo Pendenza 
University of Salerno 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: In a Europe of many lights and shadows, cosmopolitan sociology provides a valid theoretical 
framework to distinguish one from the other. If cosmopolitan sociology is an attempt to understand how 
individuals, social groups and institutions deal with the challenges of ever more transnational social 
processes, then the European issue can be fully inserted within such an approach. From this point of view, 
following the austerity policies and recent events involving Syrian refugees and the attack by Daesh 
activists at the heart of Europe, sociology has started to enquire whether a cosmopolitan Europe is still 
possible. Conversaly, in the history of Europe and in its Constitutional Treaties, traces of cosmopolitanism 
are to be found almost everywhere. In this context, our study examines the crisis pervading Europe today 
and highlights the standing back to a certain extent of cosmopolitan sociology. At the same time, it 
stresses the hope that a change of direction will occur and the opportunity grasped of reflecting more 
deeply on the founding principles of cosmopolitan Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One might ask, what finalité should direct the process of European integration and 
along which lines should the project be oriented? Is it legitimate to consider such goals 
directives for a political vision of the future of Europe? A basic answer relative to the 
present and destiny of Europe could be that if it hopes to resolve its crisis Europe 
needs both to link its project to a highly imaginative vision of the future and to explore 
new concepts to underpin integration polices that effectively enhance the genuine 
sense of its origins.  
The difficulty however is choosing between the various visions of Europe. What is 
needed is a project based on principles and concepts of wide social consensus inspired 
by liberal and human values. Such values have sustained Europe ever since its 
inception as a political plan immediately following the catastrophe of the Second 
World War. Of the many ‘philosophical ideas’ of Europe in which European history 
abound, not all, obviously, are based on such significant values. At best, they are far 
too abstract for political action; in other cases, hopefully to remain in obscurity, the 
bellicose and aggressive elements of such ideas have been more a problem than a 
solution for Europe (as the attempts of Charlemagne, Charles V, Napoleon I and even 
Hitler, to build European Empires have testified). On the other hand, it is undeniable 
that certain ideas kindled by noble and humanitarian ideals have been a guiding light 
for the champions of Europe. The idea of ‘perpetual peace’ deriving from Abbé Saint 
Pierre and from Kant, which inspired both the project of a United Europe and 
Schuman’s speech of 9 May 1950, immediately comes to mind. The same applies to the 
idea expressed in the Manifesto of Ventotene in 1944, drafted by Altiero Spinelli and 
Ernesto Rossi, in which totalitarian regimes are rebutted and a truly federal Europe 
advocated. Both ideas, often historically convergent, are far-sighted examples of the 
power of political thought as well as the capacity to mobilise populations. 
Could ‘cosmopolitanism’, we ask, be included among such propulsive and positive 
forces? We believe so and that is ample justification for this Special Issue on 
PArtecipazione e COnflitto dedicated to its potential convergence with the project of 
Europe. We consider that cosmopolitanism has the right and the vigour to be 
incorporated among the cardinal ideas on which the principle of unified Europe is 
founded and a point of reference for all those who believe in the respect for human 
dignity, of the environment within and outside the borders of Europe and not least, of 
cultural diversity. Not everyone would agree with us, for example those who consider 
cosmopolitanism a vague ideal, utopian, idealistic and élitarian. Above all, those who 
doubt cosmopolitanism’s holding capacity, especially after the recent rejection of 
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immigrants at European borders and the policies of austerity put in place by European 
member States against other member States. We have ascertained above all that there 
is a gap between political scientists and sociologists, between scholars in general and 
political decision makers relative to the effective convergence between cosmopo-
litanism and Europe. While political scientists – with a few exceptions (Archibugi 1998; 
Rifkin 2004a) – retain an ambivalent attitude towards cosmopolitanism (considering it 
non-realistic and intangible in a world still centred – so they say – on the national 
state), for many sociologists on the contrary, cosmopolitanism (especially applied to 
Europe) is already a reality in an advanced state of progression. It would be tedious to 
mention all the studies dedicated to this issue however, the guidelines underpinning 
the truly convincing proposals are worthy of note. The most avid supporters of the 
cosmopolitan outlook in sociology have stressed their interest of extending its 
foundations to the analysis of the European reality in order to provide a relevant 
theoretical framework for a political project for Europe (Habermas 2003; Delanty 2005; 
Delanty and Rumford 2005; Rumford 2005, 2007; Beck and Grande 2007a/b). For these 
authors, European identity would be too ‘thin’ for comparison with the integrating 
strength of nations, but inclusive enough to act as a transcendent framework of 
national belonging. 
Although there is fervent debate among social scientists on using the cosmopolita-
nism paradigm for Europe albeit contrasted, this is not the case for political decision 
makers, for whom political Europe is decisively not a cosmopolitan project. From this 
perspective, the EU hovers midway between cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolita-
nism. For example, the Treaty of Amsterdam welcomes States that wish to adhere to 
the EU but it obliges them to accept acquis communautaire; while it sanctions free 
movement within the EU for its citizens, at the same time, it erects barriers against 
non-European immigrants. A plausible reason for this could be the fact that cosmopoli-
tanism brings to mind the idea of supranational identity, far too excessive for many 
European countries still strongly linked to their national peculiarities.  
On the other hand, in EU official documents there are virtually no traces of the term 
‘cosmopolitanism’, nor is the word ever mentioned in official European public discour-
ses. At the same time however, elements of cosmopolitanism are undeniably present. 
Furthermore, the European Commission or the EU have incontrovertibly advocated the 
universal application of human rights and individual protection in the following 
insititutions: the European Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of European Union, the Framwork Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum and the Framework Decision 
on Combatting Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia. In the past, with the Copen-
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hagen Declaration on European Identity in 1973 an attempt was made to create a 
European cosmopolitan attitude forged on a common identity. The declaration aimed 
to balance the preserving of national cultures through their ‘legal, political and moral 
order[s]’ and the shared values of ‘representative democracy, rule of law and social 
justice’.  
The building of Europe however, demands ideas not only intentions and we are con-
vinced that fostering a cosmopolitan Europe would be a positive starting point. Had we 
been able to count on that in 2005 when talks on the Constitutional Treaty were on-
going, perhaps a Europe established on different principles compared to those of today 
would have been the outcome. In short, if the idea of a ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ is to be 
more than a mere belief in people’s minds (mostly ‘enlightened’ intellectuals debating 
in university halls or in newspapers), we have to ensure that it is grounded in political 
acts, documents and official institutions as well as in people’s behaviour. The only way 
of proceeding and sustaining the cause is, in our view, to guarantee that this idea 
becomes intrinsic to the rationale of official documents, especially in the Consitutional 
Treaties of Europe.  
The purpose of this work is to delineate European cosmopolitanism, highlighting its 
finalité, and subsequently, to analyse the current crisis gripping Europe and, at the 
same time, to propose a cosmopolitan research agenda for the future. European 
cosmopolitanism will be defined not on the basis of a philosophical idea but within the 
specifics of European history and in the Constitutional Treaties and the Charter of 
European Fundamental Human Rights. As will be evident, the above charters albeit 
bereft of great idealism, do include a minimum of implicitly cosmopolitan grammar or 
what Alessandro Ferrara calls the ‘semantics of hope’ (2008). Such principles and re-
spect for human dignity furthermore, can be traced in certain European historico-
cultural features. They distinguish Europe from other social and political global spaces 
and enable us to sustain the thesis of Europe as a potential space for cosmopolitanism, 
a prospective reality rather than an inevitable historical horizon. It should be consi-
dered as a process that allows the observer to confront reality within a theoretical 
framework. Notwithstanding, issues such as the national debt in European countries 
and more recently events regarding the management of asylum seekers, do not pre-
figure the unfolding of cosmopolitan ideals either within or outside the European 
borders. What we are currently witnessing is the gap between the historical expe-
riences of a cosmopolitan Europe, the intentions endorsed in the Charters, and the 
reality of Europe which is challenging its capacity, its destiny, its deepest feelings, its 
idealism and its history.  
 
V. Cicchelli and M. Pendenza,  The Looming Shadow of the Walls. Is a Cosmopolitan Europe still Possible? 
 
629 
 
2. Europe as a potential space for cosmopolitanism 
 
Then, what is this call for a cosmopolitan Europe built upon? The history, geography 
and demography of the continent is certainly oriented towards cosmopolitanism. In the 
1980s, the French philosopher and sociologist, Edgar Morin argued with force that as 
Europe is a ‘complex’ entity, any analysis of it must be based on the ‘Gordian knot’ in 
which so many ‘political, economic, social, cultural, religious and anti-religious histories 
are interwoven and interconnected in both conflicting and harmonious ways’ (Morin 
1987, 26). Europe is a continent that is haunted by both divisions and alliances with 
very passionate claims regarding identity, ethnicity and nationalities. The special corre-
spondent Paolo Rumiz relates a conference made by Vaclav Havel during which the 
Czech leader declared that in Europe ‘identities stick together and have no alternative 
between war and cohabitation, between self-destruction and being a unitary space in 
terms of spirit and culture. Europe is an archipelago in which diversities are interlinked 
to such an extent that the absence of just one of them would lead to its total collapse. 
It is a stomach able to digest peoples and cultures without ever making an informal 
mix’ (Rumiz 2003, 65). Lastly, for the geographer Jacques Lévy (1997), the main chara-
cteristic of Europe is the coexistence of distinct social and cultural differences in one 
single relatively small area. Within Europe, exchanges between populations are rela-
tively easy: it has high levels of population density, major cities that are only compara-
tively short distances from each other and a limited number of natural obstacles.  
But that is not all. As we have already pointed out, Europe is a potential space for 
cosmopolitanism especially compared to other geographical areas, in particular the 
United States. If we adopt a perspective inspired by Tocqueville’s analysis of democra-
cy, we could apply a comparative method to confirm this. But why does Europe – in our 
view – represent a diverse historical space, compared to the USA, in terms of cosmopo-
litanism? As much as one might disagree with the observation of Martinelli (2007), 
relative to the fact that these two areas of the world can be considered as ramifications 
of Western modernity, it is undeniable that at least their roots are the same. The West 
has been the vital sap of both spaces, there is no question about that. Yet, elements of 
the European political space differ from those of the USA which depend on the history 
and political and cultural choice of each and which distinguish one from the other in 
cosmopolitan terms. At least three of these elements are relevant: a) relations with the 
enemy; b) the relation between capitalism and democracy and c) the building of Euro-
pe, including the drafting of Constitutional Treaties. For Ferrara (2008, cap. 8), these 
three elements constitute Europe as an ‘exemplary force’. 
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The first element deals with the outcomes of the war and the representation of the 
enemy to defeat. For cultural and territorial reasons, if we exclude the Civil War, the 
USA has never been obliged to fight endogenous enemies. This has determined a 
‘border culture’ which transmits even today a widespread sense of justified suppresion 
of the enemy and an unlimited physical-geographical expandibility of the American 
way of life that induces the negation of the rights of Others and arbitrarily decides their 
fate. The war against Nazism, the dangers of Communism in the USSR and, nowadays, 
the Daesh, are pertinent examples. In contrast, the historical experiences of wars in 
Europe have taught above all the changing face as well as the ineliminability of the 
enemy. In other words, not an abstract enemy but the expression of diversity to be 
reckoned with always and in any case. Leaving out the imperialistic and colonialist wars 
which seem to deny a substantial difference in this respect between USA and Europe, 
not to mention the Holocaust, the internal conflict between European countries, albeit 
cruel and fratricide has always resulted in a definitive conclusion. The EU is itself an 
example, especially if one considers the impossibility of even imagining the establishing 
of a Franco-German axis which only a few years before the Second World War repre-
sented the greatest obstacle to bulding Europe. These consideration lead to an inevi-
table question. If we shift this difference between the EU and the USA to globalisation 
scale according to which borders tend to expand and blend into the globe on one hand 
(while the interaction between States becomes more numerous and complex due to 
global competition on the other), given the American stance that aims at expanding 
and overcoming its borders and the European position that transforms borders into 
boundaries to cross (limen), which of the two is closer to the cosmopolitan ideal? 
The second element links European history to the particular relation it has with 
capitalism, democracy and welfare. This bond is quite different compared to that pre-
sent in the USA. As is well known, except at its beginnings, the spreading of European 
democracy has never been based merely on free trade and a free market economy. At 
least since the end of the Second World War, in Europe the regulation of free trade 
imposed itself over the self-regulation of the marketplace. The outcome has been more 
a kind of capitalism under surveillance and kept ‘under control’ – linked to a system of 
redistribution of wealth called the Welfare State – rather than a capitalistic system that 
put free enterprise before solidarity or deregulation before the norming of 
utilitarianism. The ‘neo-liberal’ formula with which we now label this particular relation 
of solidarity subordinated to the marketplace, is rather a novelty nowdays for Europe 
(or perhaps a comeback after the wild capitalism typical of the late XIX and early XX 
centuries that Europe even promoted with the Freiburg School), accepted passively as 
an inevitable historical law of global human, economic development. In other words, 
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while in Europe the relation between democracy and capitalism has always been di-
stinguished by a certain tension giving rise to open conflict at times, in America it has 
generally been translated in the coexistence, most probably fostered by a certain 
conception – glorified by Emerson’s expression of ‘self-reliance’ – of the individual. 
From the social doctrine of the Church to Socialism and Social Democracy, Europe has 
always considered capitalism more a price to pay for the establishing of democracy 
rather than an element, inequivocably taken for granted, of human development. A 
price that Europe accepted only insofar as it did not impair the human and social rights 
earned with difficulty through social conflict to resolve the issues of the Workers and 
those of women’s rights. As in the previous case, the question arises: why not grasp the 
inequivocable fact that the EU more so than the USA (and any other part of the world) 
is the ideal place to enjoy the spirit of cosmopolitanism?  
The third element compares the two political orders and the respective modes of 
institutional government. The American politico-institutional system crystalised in a 
Constitution that sets out the goals has an institutional architecture that assigns fun-
ctions and remits specific to the government bodies. The European system, on the con-
trary, is an ongoing project, subject to constant change and with unclear goals. While 
the American Constitution is an istitutive act of an already defined, political reality, the 
European Constitution is still in the making. Furthermore, as many political commen-
tators rightly point out, the biggest difference is above all that marked by the presence 
or otherwise of an istitutive demos. This is not of little importance, if we consider that – 
before the European Constitution – a constituent process had never been conceived 
without a people, where now there are many. Given this state of affairs, at first sight 
the considerations infer that Europe has still a long way to go to equal the modus 
operandi that characterises all Consititutions worldwide. Yet, what we notice is rather 
that the limits of Europe’s Constitution are also its strength(s). If we look at the situa-
tion from a different perspective, we cannot help but notice that what the European 
Constitution is achieving albeit with difficulty, is the blueprinting of a global post-natio-
nal political order. Seen in this light, it is the first attempt in the world to split what mo-
dernity has grouped together and what globalisation has put in crisis. It is an attempt 
to overcome the narrow borders of the Nation-state by generating a privileged space 
for cosmopolitanism and embedding it in the founding institutions of Europe. However, 
the European Constitution does not envisage explicitly nor wish for the elimination of 
the Nation-state. On the contrary, with its in fieri Constitution, Europe is striving to 
harmonise the diverse national specifics and political orders with a supra-national 
identity. Undoubtedly, this is no easy task. Before Europe, who succeeded in doing this, 
except by annexing countries? The EU, Beck and Grande (2007a, 121) have said, is ‘an 
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open project’, whose borders have not yet been defined.This means welcoming anyone 
who wishes to become part of the great European family, sharing its values but above 
all, accepting participation in the cosmopolitan project of governance and voluntary 
inclusion that has no equal in the world. 
In short, despite the ferocious internal conflicts that have lasted for centuries, not to 
mention fratricide wars, Europe seems to have achieved ‘perpetual peace’, created the 
Welfare State and is a place par excellence for social policy. Even without demos, 
Europe’s in fieri project for constitutional unity represents a particular social space 
grounded in cosmopolitan experiences and elected to an institutional project of a 
cosmopolitan kind. 
 
 
3. Tracing cosmopolitan insights in the fabric of EU Charters 
 
At this stage we empirically analyse whether and to what extent cosmopolitan in-
sights are evident in the fabric of the Constitutional Treaties and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. When work was ongoing on a Convention to underpin the 
European Constitution during the three-year period 2001-2004, the starting point was 
not only realistic but also cosmopolitan in intent. The Convention was based on two 
premises: the enhancement of common elements in current legislation in each mem-
ber country of the Union and the need to draft details of rights and shared values. The 
outcome met expectations. The final document was imbued with a universal spirit 
founded on individual dignity, freedom, equal rights, solidarity and social justice. Its 
pillars were democracy and a legal order, in line with nearly all Western and European 
constitutional democracies, although at supra-national scale. After the French and 
Danish referendum, the final document, the EU Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, had lost much 
of its universal spirit. In the Preamble, for example, a significant sentence eloquent of 
cosmopolitanism indicating Europe as a ‘privileged space for human hope’ was no 
longer to be found. Despite this omission, many of the references to individual dignity 
and the fundamental rules and values of peaceful coexistence between European 
citizens are still in place. Undeniably, they ‘trace’ the presence of cosmopolitanism in 
the European Union’s institutional documents. 
After 2007, the two Lisbon Treaties were amended several times. The latest ver-
sions drafted in 2012 – defined tecnically as the Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
European Union and the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union – interest us most together with the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Our analysis does not concern Protocols (47), Annexes (2) and Declarations (65) 
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linked to the two Treaties nor the over 400 articles that make it seem more like a ‘legal 
contract’ rather than ‘a constitution accesible to everyone’. We examine only relevant 
articles taken mainly from the Preambles of the two Treaties, from the Principles and 
from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to trace elements of cosmopolitanism in 
Europe by reading between the lines.  
From the two Preambles, the elements linked to the political identity of Europe are 
highlighted. Citing the Preamble of the Treaty on European Union, we observe that the 
signatories draw inspiration  
 
from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have 
developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human 
person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law.  
 
The signatories also confirm the above rights together with those of “fundamental 
social rights”, desire “to deepen the solidarity between their peoples”. Furthermore, 
they resolve “to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peo-
ples of Europe”. The same applies to the Preamble to the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, of a much more economic and politico-institutional nature, in 
which we read that the signatory States intend “to confirm the solidarity which binds 
Europe and the overseas countries” and resolve “by thus pooling their resources to 
preserve and strengthen peace and liberty”. 
Unfortunately, we do not find such resounding ideals expressed in the great prose 
inspiring the collective imagination such as “we the people of the United States…”, 
“life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”, or “liberté, égalité, fraternité”. At the same 
time, such declarations reveal an ideal dialogue which calls to mind all the great Euro-
pean principles and values based on the dignity of the person, democracy, freedom 
and solidariety. These cosmopolitan principles are set out more clearly in Art. 2 of the 
first of the two Treaties and are the effective core finalité of the EU project:  
 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail. 
 
‘Peace’ is another value present in the two Preambles and in the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. It declares specifically in Art. 3, para. 1: “The Union's aim is to 
promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”. Peace has been the core 
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aim underpinning the project of Europe ever since its conception in Rome in 1957 and 
is reiterated in that highly symbolic of the Nobel Peace Prize Award to the EU on 10th 
December 2012 “for [having] contributed to the advancement of peace and recon-
ciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”. Also in Art. 3, other values are to be 
found such as: the safeguarding of the environment, sustainable development, full 
employment for all, combating social exclusion and discrimination, eliminating poverty, 
equal rights, solidariety between generations and the protection of consumers. In para. 
5 of Art. 3, there is also a peremptory declaration whereby the EU proposes to act as a 
global cosmopolitan player. In this paragraph it is declared that  
 
in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and 
interests, [….] and contribute [amongst other things] to the protection of human rights.  
 
At social scale, Europe resolves furthermore to promote the wellbeing of its citizens 
by taking ‘initiatives to ensure coordination of Member States' social policies (Art. 5, 
para. 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). In this case, the EU in-
tends to give consistency to and spread throughout the world its model of social soli-
darity, one of the characteristic cosmopolitan traits of European civilisation compared 
to the rest of the world.  
However, the institutional European document containing the most relevant ele-
ments of innovation tracing cosmopolitan matters and principles, is certainly that of 
the Nice Charter (now the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). Although the Nice Char-
ter is merely an Annex to the most recent Treaties, it has become a document binding 
European institutions and member States. It is on a par with Treaties and their annexed 
Protocols and its force has not been diminished in anyway. It should be added that, 
since the start, the intention of the EU Treaties has never been that of creating a 
community of fundamental rights and in this respect, they have never contained dispo-
sitions dedicated explicitly to the basic prerogatives that qualify ‘man’ as such rather 
than just as a legal entity. In the Preamble, the Charter defines a basis of shared values 
in respect of “the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe”. 
Subsequently, it lists and then defines one by one, six fundamental rights – dignity, 
freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights and justice – as rights to safeguard. To-
gether, they form essential principles which highlight the EU’s desire for a cosmo-
politan space in which human dignity, not only that of EU citizens, is implicitly guaran-
teed.  
It is unfortunate that the Charter has been excluded from the Treaties when – prior 
to Lisbon – it had been imagined as the pillar upon which to base the constituenda 
institutional integration of the European peoples. Was this perhaps already a sign of 
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the inverted tendency of anti-cosmopolitanism in Europe? Could it be considered an 
incipient (a)moral and institutional wedge by means of which the subsequent econo-
mic austerity policies and the walls erected by proto-nationalist States could have later 
prospered? From this perspective, the looming shadows are more than one and 
emerging trends are certainly disquieting.  
 
 
4. The looming shadows 
 
As highlighted previously, the promotion of peace in Europe – afflicted historically by 
bloody wars – is the real goal underlying the European project right from its design. 
However this is not really the case and the recent wars in Kosovo and the Ukraine are 
testament. These wars are still an open wound in the enduring European peace process 
albeit undeniably, much has already been done. The wars show above all the incapacity 
of Europe to speak with a single voice on a politico-military plane, and the EU’s inade-
quacy in protecting its weakest peoples. In this respect, the phrase ‘united we stand, 
divided we fall’ has never been so true. 
Furthermore, the effects of the lack of community solidariety are still evident. 
Significantly, Art. 67, para. 2, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
recognises solidarity between the European member States and the equal dignity of 
citizens of other countries as essential principles by which community policy should be 
insipired as far as political asylum, immigration and border controls are concerned. The 
recent examples of the Syrian refugees represent the negation of such praiseworthy 
principles. The lack of shared values, in contrast, signify a dramatic legislative and juri-
dical vacuum. Luckily, countries hobble along although citizens do not. Not so long ago, 
while governments were erecting walls, real or on paper, bottom up mobilisations 
were taking place everywere: Icelanders on Facebook offered flights and hospitality to 
the Syrians, Parisians gathered together in Place de la République, the Finnish leader 
welcomed refugees to his home, the Pope exorted his parish priests to open the doors 
of their churches otherwise – he affirmed – they are just museums, cars in Vienna were 
moving in convoys to collect the refugees, German, Hungarian, Austrian, Czech volun-
teers and Bavarian policemen sang the European Anthem together and welcomed the 
first train of refugees arriving in Hauptbahnhof Central Station of Munich from Orbàn’s 
Hungary. 
Is Europe suffering from a certain form of schizophrenia, one might ask? Do two se-
parate Europes exist? Is the Europe of the institutions different from that of European 
civil society? We know that that is not the case. Everywhere racist movements are 
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spreading, rejecting foreigners in the name of national identity and interests to 
maintain. Debate is in ferment, public opinion is swayed between one or the other 
argument. Political parties in France, Italy, Great Britain, Hungary, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece and Poland – just to mention a few – are putting forward their political pro-
grammes based on rejecting immigration, the exit from the Euro, regaining national 
sovreignty, the violent criticism of the Eurocrats in Brussels (Enzensberger 2011).  
In addition to the fact that these elements are casting shadows on the cosmopolitan 
project of Europe, it is not surprising that, with few exceptions, after the great season 
of the first decade of the century, sociologists have almost stopped speaking about 
cosmopolitan Europe. Nowadays, the semantics of interpreting Europe has also 
completely changed and the metaphor of Europe as a cosmopolitan mosaic seems no 
longer effective. This image, apparently belonging to the past, however still evokes the 
vision of a European political project with a cosmopolitan character whereby all na-
tional and cultural differences are acknowledged as essential for the structure of Eu-
rope as a whole. Therefore, Europeans ought to perceive their European neighbours as 
both similar and different and the diversity in national traditions seen not as a weak-
ness for Europe, but as a strength. We are at a crossroads today, although Europe 
could risk losing its common identity, it can still change direction and acquire full 
awareness of its characteristic cosmopolitan potential and diversity. The question is: 
how can such a cosmopolitan conception be fostered given both the return of old and 
new rivalries on the European scene (North vs South, East vs West) and the perception 
of non-Europeans as a potential risk?  
 
 
5. What sociology for a cosmopolitan Europe? A research agenda in times of 
crisis 
 
To what extent is cosmopolitan sociology a viable way to capture the complexity of 
the transnational processes that European societies are dealing with? In our view, 
cosmopolitan sociologists need to delineated an agenda of future research in order to 
give some credence to the idea of Europe based on a cosmopolitan perspective. 
If cosmopolitan sociology can be considered as an attempt to understand how indivi-
duals, social groups and institutions deal with the challenges of ever more transnatio-
nal social processes, then the European issue can be fully inserted within such an ap-
proach. On the two distinct planes of socialisation of individuals and of their governan-
ce, Europe represents in miniature, a field of observation of how citizens and insti-
tutions are dealing with situations that require conceptual frameworks and analyses of 
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social reality that go beyond the traditional sociology of Nation-states. It would there-
fore be opportune to attempt to understand such transnational dynamics by examining 
the internal and external, political and symbolic dicotomies of borders uniting groups 
(from micro- to macro-scales) becoming nowadays, ever more open and ever more 
closed. In Gerard Delanty’s view (2009, 52-53), “the cosmopolitanism imagination oc-
curs when and wherever new relations between Self, Other and world develop in 
moments of openness”. 
A cosmopolitan perspective embraces such dynamics. Europe can be defined as 
cosmopolitan when it is observed that: a) European citizens interact with and relate to 
one another (despite their origins or their nationality within or outside Europe) in such 
a way that neither ego nor alter are assimilated to something resembling a totalising 
unity (unicum); b) national states act not only in defence of their cultural and ethnic 
borders, but enhance the individual as such, without neglecting explicit reference to 
culture and local/national senses of belonging and the concomitant social ties proper 
to the Nation-state; c) Europe acts as a political supranational entity with greater 
responsibilities (compared to individual nations), and is called on as a global player. 
Another priority of Europe, as is well known, is that of safeguarding part of the 
European spiritual heritage – human rights, pluralism, tolerance, laicité, social welfare 
policies, the welfare of citizens, and so on. 
These considerations are a claim for a contemporary renaissance of European 
cosmopolitan studies. Future research should therefore, address a cosmopolitan 
Europe from at least the following three dimensions: the observation and comprehe-
nsion of how citizens live out simultaneously cosmopolitanism and ‘banal’ nationalism 
(e.g. considering themselves both national and supranational citizens) in conformity 
with a cosmopolitan logic that does not, however, exclude reference to the Nation-
state but incorporates it in a complementary manner with that of belonging to Europe; 
the shift of focus onto Nation-states to grasp whether and to what extent they absolve 
their remit of guaranteeing freedom, justice, tolerance and ‘education’ in terms of 
cosmopolitan praxis, observing for example, whether and to what extent they continue 
to act in terms of defending (culturally, politically, and in other ways) their national 
borders; a higher scale of observation related to the extent and the ways in which Eur-
ope defends and promotes a cosmopolitan position through legislation and actions in 
the world. 
There is a real shortfall of knowledge in the literature devoted to these topics, 
especially when cosmopolitanism is put to the test of the severe crisis that European 
countries are facing. During the last decade, and especially after the financial crisis in 
2008, political parties and movements with a nationalistic agenda all gained ground. 
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Such parties are opposed to further European cooperation or expansion of the Union 
(Halman, Sieben and Van Zundert 2011). We need to ask the following questions: a) 
how are European societies dealing with the question of ‘otherness’, with increasing 
‘multiculturalism’?; b) how do European societies react to migration flows?; c) how do 
they cope with the effects of immigration? 
The concept of globalisation “refers both to the compression of the world and the 
intensification of the consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson 1992, 8). One 
of the widely accepted consequences of the globalised, mobile society is the 
development of individual outlooks, behaviors and feelings that transcend local and 
national boundaries. On the scale of Europe, can we affirm that this crisis is improving 
the image of Europe as a whole? 
It is a well known fact that the cultural and historical diversity and the (recently) 
peaceful coexistence of the EU member countries is the most characteristic feature of 
Europe, which means a lot to European people. The painful past, made up of wars, 
genocides and persecutions, has been forgotten for the sake of peace and equal dignity 
of each country. Are we witnessing the emerging in Europe of new kinds of rivalries 
between states, geo-cultural configurations, namely between northern and central Eu-
rope and southern Europe on one hand and between the ‘old’ States of the European 
Community and the newcomers on the other? 
As we already know, the inhabitants of Europe do not feel European or refer to 
themselves as European: they regard themselves foremost as Spanish, French, Greek, 
Swedish, Estonian, etc. Compared to national identities, the extent of a strong 
European identity is still to be confirmed. The Union is not yet in the hearts and minds 
of its inhabitants. “The European flag or hymn don’t evoke the same patriotic feelings 
as they do in their American counterpart” (Halman, Sieben and Van Zundert 2012). 
However, it seems crucial to know how people living in European societies perform not 
only national but also transnational and cosmopolitan identities. What educational, or 
cultural baggage do young people need today if they are to become citizens of Europe 
and of a global society? (Cicchelli 2012). Furthermore, a public sphere in Europe in the 
making seems undoubtable. New modes of protest, claim-making and collective action 
(such as the young indignados in Spain, the Occupy protests, the social uprising in the 
Arab Spring, the unrest in Greece, and discontent in other European countries) are all 
indicative of the rising of a European transnational public sphere. This sphere “has 
become increasingly well defined as the space in which citizens of the European Union 
can utter their voice freely” (Eder 2006, 340). In this respect, how does crisis contribute 
to expanding the public sphere beyond the cultural container of nations? 
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From regional point of view, Chris Rumford (2002, 44) maintains that “rather than 
representing the local in a global/local continuum or being the beneficiaries of a 
postmodern form of European integration which advantages them over member 
states, the region is better thought of as the EU’s accommodation to globalization”. 
Should we move beyond the idea that Europe must be more integrated and more 
cohesive? Or should we still believe that strong solidarity between European countries 
and strong political integration are what we most need at this moment of European 
history? 
 
 
6. Contribution to this Special Issue 
 
Considering such an agenda, this Special Issue on Cosmopolitanism and Europe in 
PArtecipazione e COnflitto attempts to register the impact of cosmopolitan theory on 
contemporary Europe. The five articles, some empirical and other more theoretical, 
contribute to interpreting the processes of cosmopolitanism with the idea of Europe at 
its core. 
The first two articles deal with case studies. The authors contribute to narrowing the 
gap concerning the lack of observational analysis on cosmopolitanism and Europe. In 
the first case study on the European Social Forum (Florence 2012), Laura Leonardi and 
Gemma Scalise explore empirically the cosmopolitan imagination as an effective pro-
cess. In particular, the two scholars utilise Delanty’s notion of ‘civic cosmopolitanism’ as 
a conceptual tool for the interpretation of change in its principles and structure as re-
lated to Europeanisation and globalisation. They address a crucial aspect of the 
contemporary debate on European social citizenship in times of crisis. In the second 
case study, Dario Verderame concentrates on the ‘Festival of Europe’, a biennial event 
dedicated to European topics held in Florence. He analyses the organisation of the 
festival to verify whether the planning of this event has encouraged opportunities for 
stimulating cosmopolitan subjectivism addressed to Europe. On the whole, while 
Verderame’s article offers a glimpse of how Europe with its cultural policies devises top-
down strategies that favour processes of Europeanisation, Leonardi and Scalise’s article 
inform us of the same dynamics but from a bottom-up perspective, that of civil society.   
In their article, Massimo Pendenza and Livia García-Faroldi combine an empirical 
with a theoretical analysis relative to the possibility of European cosmopolitanism that 
does not reject national belonging. Using Eurobarometer data (71.3), they test the 
extent of dissemination among European citizens of a specific type of territorial be-
longing that Pendenza defines as ‘societal cosmopolitanism’. This concept expresses the 
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idea of a cosmopolitanism grounded in places and traditions, that combines attach-
ment to local territory and openness towards others. Its main characteristic (which 
distinguishes ‘societal cosmopolitanism’ from other concepts of cosmopolitanism) lies 
in the idea that it is not nourished by the abstract principle according to which the 
status of cosmopolitanism can be attributed only if one is (or feels) a ‘citizen of the 
world’. On the contrary, without totally distancing it from such an idea, the article 
highlights that if cosmopolitanism is to shrug off its liberalism, it needs social ancho-
rage to root it more firmly to real life. The interesting result emerging from the testing 
of this assumption indicates that almost 25.0% of the European citizens interviewed 
possess such characteristics (with peaks of 30-40% in some countries). 
The last two articles are theoretical and political in nature. Both express strong 
criticism of the lack of cosmopolitanism in Europe, albeit for different reasons. Robert 
Fine’s article, rich in detail, accuses Europe of having abandoned its original project 
based on the ‘Jewish question’ during the Second World War, to found in line with 
Habermas, a cosmopolitan and post-national European space. Fine endorses much of 
Habermas’ analysis, but at the same time, he criticises what he calls the ‘cracks in the 
edifice’ of Habermas’ reconstruction as they allow back in a certain form of European 
chauvinism and make it possible to believe that the problem of antisemitism in Europe 
has been solved. David Inglis, on the other hand, believes that a real project of cosmo-
politan Europe has never existed. His argument is that the EU was from the very begin-
ning ambivalently cosmopolitan, for it was structured around a liberal-economic, mar-
ket-based cosmopolitanism, as well as a rights-based conception of citizenship and 
democracy. When the latter is applied to transnational conditions a kind of legal-
political cosmopolitanism is the outcome. Both forms of cosmopolitanism existed, ac-
cording to Inglis, up until recently in a highly ambivalent relationship with each other. 
But as over time, he continues, and especially from the late 1970s, liberal-economic 
cosmopolitanism mutated into neo-liberal cosmopolitanism. As result, he concludes, 
the tensions between the two cosmopolitanisms now stand out very starkly, and have 
reached breaking point. The tension is for Inglis so marked because neo-liberal cosmo-
politanism is a ‘perverted’ or ‘fake’ cosmopolitanism, which eschews the sorts of cross-
border sympathies and care of Others which characterises cosmopolitan ethics and po-
litical practice in the most profound senses of the word. 
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